FailSafe: Advanced Security for Digital Assets
  • Introduction to FailSafe
  • Whitepaper
    • Introduction
      • Defense-in-Depth
      • Forward Security
    • Web3 Threats to Your Crypto
      • The Human Factor: Design with Operator Error in Mind
    • Defense-in-Depth & the Lifecycle of a Transaction
      • Defense 1: de-risk Web3 Asset Positions
      • Defense 2: FailSafe Blockchain Reconnaissance
      • Defense 3: FailSafe Interceptor Service
      • Discussion
    • FailSafe Architecture
      • Forward Security in FailSafe
        • Quantum Threats to EVM-based Blockchains
          • On ECDSA Key Re-use
          • On New Quantum-resilient Alternatives
          • Account Abstraction as a Path to Sunseting ECDSA on Ethereum?
        • Introducing the Quantum Migration Tool (qMig)
          • Assumptions and Goals
          • How Does qMig work?
          • Discussion
          • FailSafe+qMig
    • Conclusion
    • Further Reading
  • How FailSafe helps your Organisation
    • Reduce Attack Surface Area
    • Radar for Security Risks
    • React to Malicious Threats
    • Forward Security against Looming Quantum Computing Threats
  • FailSafe as a tool for Enterprise Risk Management
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Quantum Threats to EVM-based Blockchains

Last updated 2 years ago

Shor’s Algorithm makes it possible for a sufficiently powerful quantum computer to break the ECDSA algorithm. That is, starting from a transaction signed with an ECDSA private key, one can extract the public key and then derive the private key. This is the ultimate game over condition, as the attacker can then transfer any balance associated with the external owned account (EOA) at will.

In contrast, quantum computers pose no such (known) threat to hashing algorithms. Grover’s Algorithm [ (aka quantum search algorithm), reduces the search for collisions in (Ethereum’s hash algorithm) from 2^256 to 2^128 which is less efficient than some . (A quick peek ahead: this hashing resilience to quantum attacks will play a key role in our approach).

For the underlying cryptography, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) initiated a for quantum resilient signature schemes, and is currently evaluating a number of . All of these come with their own set of trade-offs, particularly when compared with key size, speed and re-use of the same key pair by the EVM family of blockchains [see ].

In terms of the threat timeline, (i.e, how long until quantum hardware is capable of breaking ECDSA), estimates vary between experts. Many believe the threat is still in the distant future (e.g., was famously quoted comparing ).

For a systematic approach, the Global Risk Institute conducts an annual survey on the threat timeline of leading subject matter experts. According to its , the “likelihood” estimates have been trending upwards from initial surveys. Nearly 25% of respondents estimated a 50% chance for the threat to materialise within a 10-year time window in light of recent advances (i.e., & ) and the nation state competition (aka “quantum race”) with high levels of funding. The inevitable question, much like the plight of global warming, isn’t a question of ‘if’ - it’s a question of ‘when’.

[Peter W. Shor, 1994]
Lov K. Grover, 1996]
Keccak-256
generic collision search algorithms
standardisation effort
candidate schemes
B. Westerban for discussion
Vitalik
quantum computing advances to going from hydrogen bombs to harnessing nuclear fusion
2022 report
Google’s Quantum Supremacy
IBM Quantum System One