FailSafe: Advanced Security for Digital Assets
  • Introduction to FailSafe
  • Whitepaper
    • Introduction
      • Defense-in-Depth
      • Forward Security
    • Web3 Threats to Your Crypto
      • The Human Factor: Design with Operator Error in Mind
    • Defense-in-Depth & the Lifecycle of a Transaction
      • Defense 1: de-risk Web3 Asset Positions
      • Defense 2: FailSafe Blockchain Reconnaissance
      • Defense 3: FailSafe Interceptor Service
      • Discussion
    • FailSafe Architecture
      • Forward Security in FailSafe
        • Quantum Threats to EVM-based Blockchains
          • On ECDSA Key Re-use
          • On New Quantum-resilient Alternatives
          • Account Abstraction as a Path to Sunseting ECDSA on Ethereum?
        • Introducing the Quantum Migration Tool (qMig)
          • Assumptions and Goals
          • How Does qMig work?
          • Discussion
          • FailSafe+qMig
    • Conclusion
    • Further Reading
  • How FailSafe helps your Organisation
    • Reduce Attack Surface Area
    • Radar for Security Risks
    • React to Malicious Threats
    • Forward Security against Looming Quantum Computing Threats
  • FailSafe as a tool for Enterprise Risk Management
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  1. Whitepaper
  2. FailSafe Architecture
  3. Forward Security in FailSafe
  4. Introducing the Quantum Migration Tool (qMig)

FailSafe+qMig

Users enrolled into the FailSafe system are afforded the quantum threat protections developed as part of the qMig tool. This is facilitated in two steps. As part of wallet address enrollment in the user’s FailSafe contract shown in figure 2, a separate call is made by the client to register an incognito transfer intent with the quantum migration proofs contract (as described in the previous section). Secondly, as part of the enrollment transaction, the user’s FailSafe contract calls the qMig contract, registering an intent to transfer funds from the FailSafe contract to one or more user wallet addresses registered with the contract.

After the quantum inflection point, during the bridging of assets to a quantum resilient network, the qMig contract can then take into account any transfers from the contract back to the wallet. To prevent fraudulent transfers due to ECDSA cryptography compromise, recall that the amount permitted to transfer for a given source address is the balance at quantum inflection point, subtract from the sum total of all withdraws since that block number (up to the most recent block) and adjusted for any other transfer intents to the source address that were registered prior to the inflection point.

Last updated 2 years ago